$637,500 settlement after head-on collision resulting in gastrointestional injuries

January 24th, 2012

The plaintiff was a 60-year-old male employed as an engineer.  He suffered a head-on collision which resulted in gastrointestional injuries.  Treatment included an end colostomy procedure, a surgical procedure in which the colon (large bowel) is severed and the functioning end is brought to the skin at the abdomen.  Excrement is expelled into a bag attached to the abdomen.  At the time of settlement the plaintiff had not yet decided on whether to have a surgical colostomy reversal.  The plaintiff was hospitalized for 19 days in a convalescent state and later underwent physical therapy.  Other injuries included pelvic fractures, right fibula fracture and right knee contusion, none of which were treated surgically.  Total medical expenses were $144,933.  Lost wages were $38,887.  This case settled for $637,500 shortly after I filed suit.  Click HERE to read a more detailed report from Virginia Lawyers’ Weekly.

Woman’s DUI charge dismissed where “Implied Consent” law did not apply

December 22nd, 2011

From a gas station/convenience store parking lot, my client sat in the driver-seat of her car with the engine off but the key in the “on” or “accessory” position.  She phoned police in connection with a domestic dispute she was having with her husband.  She told police her location.  Police arrived and she admitted to having consumed alcohol.  Police noted that her car engine was off but her key was in the “on” or “accessory” position.  She performed somewhat poorly on field sobriety tests.  Police suspected her of DUI and had her submit to a breath test.  A certificate of breath analysis showed my client to have had a BAC of .11 at the time of the test.  Unfortunately for my client, there is lots of legal precedent in Virginia which provides that merely sitting in one’s car with the key turned forward but with the engine off does constitute “operation” of a motor vehicle.  So, my client stood charged with DUI.  At trial, I argued that Virginia’s implied consent law, Va. Code 18.2-268.2 only applied to persons who drive on a public highway and not on private property and that therefore the certificate of breath analysis was inadmissible.  In this instance, the entire encounter between my client and police took place on private property.  Va. Code 18.2-268.2(A) provides in part, “any person who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway … shall be deemed … to have consented” to have samples of his breath taken for testing to determine the alcohol content of his blood.  I cited a January 2011 Virginia Supreme Court case for the proposition that the certificate of breath analysis is not admissible where the implied consent law did not apply, such as on private property:  Roseborough v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 233 (2011).  The judge agreed and sustained my motion to exclude the certificate of breath analysis from evidence.  The case then turned on the officers personal observations of the defendant, and her performance on field sobriety tests.  The judge noted that there was a suspicion that the defendant was impaired, however, her guilt was not established beyond a reasonable doubt.  The charge was dismissed.  This case was tried today in Circuit Court.  This was a “de novo” misdemeanor appeal from General District Court where my client had previously been convicted, (but appealed), under basically the same evidence.

Sailor’s DUI charge dismissed for lack of probable cause for traffic stop

December 21st, 2011

My client, an active duty U.S. Navy sailor, was temporarily in Virginia Beach for Navy training.  He celebrated his 30th birthday with friends and had consumed alcohol.  In the early hours of the morning, he left the establishment where he partied with friends.  He stated that he had not had any alcohol to drink for two-hours prior to getting behind the wheel.  He was unfamiliar with the area and decided to pull his vehicle into the parking lot of Walgreens on Holland Road at about 1:30 a.m to use his cell phone and GPS devices.  A police officer observed my client stopped in the parking lot at that late hour and initiated an encounter with my client.  At trial, the police officer testified that my client’s vehicle was stopped with engine running and brakes pressed “behind the store”; he testified that my client had a strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, that his ability to walk was swaying and that my client exhibited numerous signs of impairment on field sobriety tests.  On cross examination, I elicted more detail from the officer about the initial encounter:  The officer stated that there was no point around the Walgreens building in which my client could have concealed himself since all sides of the building are in the open.  He stated that it did not appear that my client was concealing himself.  He further stated in response to my questions that he approached my client’s vehicle, activated his emergency lights and asked for my client’s license and registration and proceeded as if an ordinary traffic stop.   The Judge granted my motion to dismiss on grounds that the officer lacked probable cause to initiate a traffic stop.  Sitting in a parking lot in a running vehicle with one’s foot on the brake at 1:30 a.m. is not sufficient legal justification for a traffic stop.  This case was heard in the Virginia Beach General District Court.

Charge of driving on suspended license dismissed for lack of probable cause for traffic stop

August 22nd, 2011

Today, my client was charged with driving on a suspded license (second offense) and defective equipment. The police officer testified that he had observed my client in a 2003 Honda and observed a cracked windshield. He initiated a traffic stop based on the cracked windshield. He stated that at the scene, my client admitted that her license was suspended. I asked the officer in cross examination about the location of the crack in the windshield. He stated that he could not remember. I asked if the crack were on the passenger side or driver side and again, he could not remember. The officer did say that he would “guess” the crack was about 12 inches long but, again, he could not state where the crack appeared on the windshield.

The “defective equipment” statute is Va. Code 46.2-1003. To be guilty, a person has to be operating a car with “defective or unsafe” equipment. I argued that not every crack in the windshield amounts to grounds for a traffic stop. The judge agreed. Without more information from the officer about whether the windshield crack posed a safety hazard, the judge found no probable cause for the stop. Accordingly, the charge of driving on a suspended license and defective equipment were dismissed.

Sample Virginia Beach Police DUI field notes

July 15th, 2011

Here are police field notes from a DUI case I defended today in Virginia Beach Circuit Court.

Sample Virginia Beach Police DUI field notes

My client was found “not guilty” because while he exhibited some signs of impairment, there were also many signs of impairment that were not present. It was a close case, so the defendant won. For any attorney defending a DUI case, a review of the standard field notes is helpful. Police officers’ testimony always track these field notes. They literally read these notes out loud in court in prosecution of DUI cases. (Note how the form instructs the officer, “point to the defendant” and how the form recites exactly how the officer should testify in court.) The standard forms allow officers to circle or check-off signs of impairment, but the forms also give the defense lawyer dozens of other signs of impairment which are not present during the encounter–i.e. any sign of impairment not circled or checked-off by the police officer. The first section relates to the officer’s observations of the defendant, (slurred speech, strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, etc.). The next page is regarding standardized field sobriety tests that police use to determine whether there is probable cause of impairment: The horizontal gaze/nystagmus test, the walk and turn test, and the one-leg stand test. An alphabet test is also included but is seldom used in my experience.

When cross examining the police officer, ask for detail about by how much or how far a defendant missed “heel to toe” or how the defendant took an “improper turn” or how many times the defendant had to put his foot down during the one-leg stand test. Often, the officer will not be able to explain the reason that he regarded the defendant’s turn as “improper” or how many times the defendant had to put his foot down, etc. Also, note that in this case, under the section regarding the officer’s observations of the defendant, the officer circled that the defendant was swaying while walking but not while standing. The officer also did not indicate loss of balance or use of arms to balance while performing the walk-and-turn test, so I was able to cross examine about this contradiction. Also, note that in this case the officer did not note how many times the defendant allegedly stepped off the line during the walk-and-turn test, yet the officer did allegedly copy about a dozen letters of the alphabet which the officer said the defendant incorrectly recited, even while the defendant was instructed to say the alphabet as fast as he could. The officer’s inability to explain exactly how the defendant took an incorrect turn, how many times he stepped off the line, how many time he put his foot down (during the one-leg stand test) were weaknesses in the officer’s testimony.

It is also important to note that in this particular case, there was no breath test available. The defendant in this particular case had refused to take a breath test. I was able to get the charge of refusal to take a breath test dismissed in General District Court on grounds described in another post on my blog. So, in this case, guilt or innocence turned on the officer’s observations of the defendant, the defendant’s performance on field sobriety tests, and a few other factual matters unrelated to breath alcohol tests.

Driver who made wide left turn at fault for auto/pedestrian accident

June 23rd, 2011

I negotiated a $100,000 settlement, which represented the limits of liability coverage, for a 69-year-old woman who was struck in a crosswalk while crossing the street and sustained multiple rib fractures and a right tibia/fibia fracture. There was some suggestion that my client was contributorily negligent for stepping off the sidewalk into the path of the turning vehicle. However, I pointed out that Va. Code 46.2-846 requires a driver who is turning left onto a multi-lane road to make the turn as closely as possible to the center of the road. In this case, the defendant driver made a wide left turn into the outer right-most lane and caused the accident. The insurance adjuster agreed to tending the policy limits.

Charge of refusal to take breath test dismissed for noncompliance with statute

June 23rd, 2011

A Virginia Beach General District Court judge granted my motion to dismiss my client’s charge of refusal to submit to a breath alcohol test. The refusal statute is Va. Code 18.2-268.3. To sustain a conviction for refusal to submit to a breath test, the following elements must be proven:
The defendant was under a lawful arrest for suspicion of DUI
The defendant refused to submit to a blood or breath test.
The arresting officer must have advised the accused from a form provided by the Executive Secretary of the Virginia Supreme Court of certain consequences of unlawful refusal.
The arresting officer must then execute the form under oath before a magistrate and certify certain facts: that the accused refused to permit a test; that the officer has read the required part of the form to the accused; that the accused after having had the form read to him still refused; and how many prior DUI convictions, if any, the accused has within 10 years.
The magisrate must attach the form to the warrant or summons.

All of the above requirements are set forth in Va. Code 18.2-268.3(B).

In my recent case, the magistrate had not attached the advisement form to the summons that was issued to my client. Instead, the officer had brought the form with him to court. I argued that the remedy for noncompliance with the statute was dismissal of the charge. The reason for such strict adherence to the statute is that there is another statute in the chapter of DUI laws, Va. Code 18.2-268.11 provides that “substantial compliance” is sufficient relating to taking and handling breath samples. However, the “substantial compliance” language in that statute does not cover handling of the refusal advisement form mentioned above. Therefore, the judge agreed that strict adherence to the refusal procedures was necessary and did grant my motion to dismiss. (Thank you to my colleage, Adam Carroll, Esq. for pointing out to me that the substantial compliance law does not apply to refusal cases).

Client guilty of cocaine offense gets lesser sentence after drug weights not attributed to him

May 17th, 2011

I just finished a sentencing hearing today in U.S. District Court, Norfolk. My client had previously pled guilty to conspiracy to import more than 500 grams of cocaine into the U.S., a class B felony punishable by a term of at least 5 years but no more than 40-years in prison. A presentence report was prepared by the U.S. Probation officer. The report calculated my client’s recommended sentencing guidelines at 108 to 135 months, or about nine to eleven years. These sentencing guidelines applied because 4 kilograms of cocaine were attributed to my client as a result of a government informant claiming he had purchased this amount of cocaine from my client in 2009. I filed an objection to the 4 kilograms of cocaine being attributed to my client. We had an evidentiary hearing which resulted in conflicting evidence. The judge ruled that it was the government’s burden to prove that those 4 kilograms were attributed to my client and the government had not met its burden. So, the judge struck those 4 kilograms from the presentence report, resulting in my client’s recommended sentencing guidelines being only 57 to 71 months. My client was ultimately sentenced to 70 months (5-years and ten-months), an outcome very favorable to my client who prior to the hearing had been facing a recommended sentence of about nine to ten years. The vast bulk of the drug weight that had been attributed to my client in his presentence report was based on the word of a several-times convicted felon who was himself seeking a reduction in his own prison time. To counter this witness, I had to subpoena to court a separate witness who rebutted the informant’s testimony.

Bribery case illustrates pitfalls of federal sentencing guidelines

May 13th, 2011

As an attorney who sometimes represents criminal defendants in federal court, I want to point out a couple of things about Phil Hamilton’s possible sentence. The federal court sentencing system provides huge-disincentives of going to trial. Once found guilty, either by way of a guilty plea or a trial, advisory sentencing guidelines are calculated based on a point system. Defendants who plead guilty instead of going to trial are credited for “acceptance of responsibility.” So, those who take their case to trial run a risk of getting a longer prison sentence in the event that they are found guilty. This creates a disincentive toward going to trial, or an incentive to just plead guilty. In addition to the disincentive toward going to trial, the federal sentencing guidelines also punish defendants who take the stand and testify on their own behalf but who end up being found guilty. The federal sentencing guidelines refer to this as a “sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice.” The rationale is that if the jury’s finding is inconsistent with the defendant’s testimony, then the defendant must have lied and therefore should be punished more harshly for “obstruction.” This is a double-whammy disincentive that any defendant in federal criminal court who might wish to defend himself and take the stand on his own behalf.
News stories I have read have reported that Phil Hamilton faces “up to 30 years” in prison. This is probably the maximum possible sentence, but most likely he will be sentenced within a guideline range which will be calculated like this:
Basic offense level for bribery by a public official: 14
If the offense involved an elected official, add 4 points
If the value of the bribe was greater than $70,000 but less than $120,000 add 8 points
If the defendant testified on his behalf and the jury verdict was inconsistent with his testimony, add 2-points for “obstruction”
Subtract 0 points for “acceptance of responsibility”
Total offense level = 28
The other count for which Hamilton was convicted, extortion, has a lower base offense level of only 9 as compared to the bribery charge which as stated above has a higher offense level of 14. So, for purposes of calculating sentencing guidelines, I am pretty sure these two charges would be grouped together and the higher-level offense as stated above would be used.
Assuming no prior criminal record, the federal sentencing guidelines for the above-described offense level is 78 to 97 months, or about 6 to 8 years. The interesting point is that under the federal sentencing guidelines, if Del. Hamilton had simply pled guilty, he would have been given 3 points of credit for “acceptance of responsibility” and would not suffer the 2-point enhancement for “obstruction.” His adjusted offense level would have been 23 instead of 28 and his recommended sentencing guidelines would be 46 to 57 months, or about 3.8 to just shy of five years. So, because he chose to go to trial and testify on his own behalf, he faces about two to three additional years of prison time.
As I followed this prosecution in the news, I thought it was a close-case as far as guilt or innocence was concerned. It seemed to me that Phil Hamilton was within reason to plead not guilty and to testify on his own behalf. It’s too bad that the decision to defend himself (if the sentencing judge follows guideline recommendations) will likely cost him a significant amount of prison time.

Client avoided 10-days mandatory jail time for 4th offense driving on suspended license

January 27th, 2011

My client came to me after she was convicted in Virginia Beach General District Court of driving on a suspended license (Va. Code 46.2-301). She noted an appeal so her case was pending in Virginia Beach Circuit Court. Unfortunately, this was her 4th offense since 2001 and it was her third offense within the last five years. A third or subsequent offense carries a mandatory minimum jail sentence of ten days. My client had no criminal record, and had only been convicted in the past of minor moving traffic violations, such as speeding. She received notice in June 2010 from the DMV that her license was suspended for lack of insurance verification. At the time of this offense, she was en route to the DMV. After being ticketed on June 14, 2010, she provided proof of insurance and got her license reinstated the following date, June 15th. Prior to my involvement, she went to General District Court and showed the judge her valid license. Still, the General District Court judge found her guilty and imposed a total of 20 days in jail, ten-days more than the mandatory minimum (15-active days to serve). The difficulty with today’s appeal in Circuit Court was that if the judge found her to be guilty of driving while knowing her license was suspended, the judge’s hand’s would be tied insofar as the judge would be required to give her at least 10-days in jail, as required under Va. Code 46.2-301. Fortuntately for my client, there is another statute for driving on a suspended license where license resinstatement is conditioned upon proof of insurance. This code section is Va. Code 46.2-302. The officer probably could have originally written this code section on the summons, but perhaps just didn’t think to do so. Unlike the statute for driving on a suspended license, Va. Code 46.2-301, a conviction under 46.2-302 does not carry any mandatory minimum jail time. The prosecutor was willing to amend my client’s charge to Va. Code 46.2-302 and agreed to recommend a sentence of 1-day of active jail time. The judge approved the agreement.